This volume is the standard accurate modern account of the organization, administration, and strategic direction of the United States Army in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Popular history has traditionally laid the responsibility for the spectacular blunders of the Spanish-American War on those military and civilian officials who controlled the War Department. But this fully documented study of all aspects of the Army administration shows quite a different picture. Cosmas, in an almost day-by-day account of both the Army and the war, makes clear the factors that invited many of its disasters. The Congressional penury of the 1890s, the political conflict in Congress between state militia advocates and the Administration, the frequent shifts of strategy forced on the Army by President William McKinley's changes in diplomacy - all contributed to the peculiarly amateur quality of the land forces that went ashore in Cuba. The Puerto Rico and Philippine campaigns, which were prosecuted later and under better circumstances, were more efficiently conducted but less newsworthy. An Army for Empire is a complete and authoritative history that moves with ease from the decisions that shaped strategy to the tactical actions before Santiago. Cosmas successfully brings into one story the diplomacy, internal politics, and military strategy of the Army at war in 1898. He shows how the war ultimately led to critical reforms and to a role for the United States Army that shaped twentieth-century history.