The end of the Cold War created a near-euphoria that nations might resort less to military force and that the Doomsday nuclear clock might stop short of midnight. Events soon dashed the higher of these hopes, but the nature of military force and the uses to which it might be put did appear to be changing. In this volume eleven leading scholars apply their particular expertise to understanding what (if anything) has changed and what has not, why the patterns are as they are, and just what the future might bring. Together, the authors address political, moral, and military factors in the decision to use or avoid military force. Case studies of the Gulf War and Bosnia, analyses of the role of women in the armed forces and the role of intelligence agencies, and studies of inter-branch and inter-agency tensions and cooperation inform the various chapters. A strong and thoughtful introduction by H. W. Brands provides the context that ties together the themes and perspectives. Scholars in this distinguished collection include Stephen Biddle, Alexander L. George, J. Bryan Hehir, Andrew Kohut, Andrew Krepinevich, James M. Lindsay, Charles Moskos, Williamson Murray, Bruce Russett, Tony Smith, and Susan L. Woodward. The volume will help scholars, policy makers, and concerned citizens contemplate national alternatives when force threatens.

The First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia set the stage on which Woodrow Wilson had to direct U.S. policy toward Czechoslovakia as it sought liberation in the early twentieth century. Betty Unterberger's now classic study of the ferment of this period and the way President Wilson dealt with it gives insight into both Great Power relations and the next eighty years of developments in Central Europe. A decade after the original publication of The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia, Unterberger has added an updated introduction that reconsiders the region in light of new knowledge gleaned from recently available Soviet, Czech, and French documents.

As America watched the fall of the Berlin Wall with great enthusiasm, President George H. W. Bush called the incident simply “a good development.” He knew that the Cold War was far from over and that bringing it to an end would require not only symbolic gestures but also practical diplomacy. During Bush’s presidency (1989–93), the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Germany was reunified, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Yet, many people believe the Cold War ended under Reagan and that Bush’s foreign policy achievements were merely an extension of Reagan’s policies. In this in-depth look at the Bush administration’s handling of the end of the Cold War, author Christopher Maynard argues that Bush actually made a fundamental shift in foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union. In part, he believes, historians have downplayed Bush’s contribution because they have focused on the strong ideological rhetoric of Reagan and Gorbachev without looking at the day-to-day process of policymaking during the Cold War. Out of the Shadow incorporates a variety of important, previously unused sources. Its focused treatment of the topic will appeal to scholars interested in both the first Bush presidency and the Cold War.

Americans consider themselves a peaceful people. Yet every generation since colonial times has taken part in war. Why? Does something in our democratic creed lead us repeatedly into hostilities? Does the American sense of mission demand that we take up arms to transform the world in our own image? Do baser motives drive national policy? Is there, in short, a distinctive American motive and style of war? Distinguished diplomatic historian Robert A. Divine considers these questions in a thoughtful retrospective of the wars of the twentieth century. He examines the process of going to war and seeks patterns showing how and why the nation becomes involved in hostilities. He then turns to the way the United States wages war, looking at how it uses force to achieve political ends. Finally, he considers how leaders bring wars to an end, a process that sheds perhaps the most light of all on the national character. Repeatedly, Divine concludes, America seeks to use warfare to create a better and more stable world, only to meet with unexpected outcomes and the seeds of new hostility. Ironically, Divine finds that America's high ideals continually prevent the very peace the nation seeks. In the epilogue, Divine applies his points to the final American war of the century, the conflict in Kosovo, which is yet another example of American involvement in perpetual wars for perpetual peace.