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Illusions of Victory book cover
Illusions of Victory
The Arab Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State
2017
First Published
4.11
Average Rating
249
Number of Pages

In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 "Surge" of American troops in Iraq, the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar Province was widely hailed as one of America's signature victories. US Marines and soldiers fought for years there, in grinding battles such as Fallujah and Ramadi that define the experience of Iraq. Eventually, the fractious tribal sheiks in that province, with the help of American troops, united in an "Awakening" that dealt AQI a stunning defeat. The Awakening's success argued that the United States could intervene in a war-torn country and, with the right strategy, bring stability and peace. It seemed to exemplify snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. A decade later, the situation in Anbar Province is dramatically different. In 2014, much of Anbar fell to the AQI's successor organization, the Islamic State, which swept through the region with shocking ease. In Illusions of Victory, Carter Malkasian looks at the wreckage to explain why the Awakening's initial promise proved misleading and why victory was unsustainable. Malkasian begins by tracing the origins of the Awakening, then turns his attention to what happened in its wake. After the United States left, Iraq's Shi'a government sidelined Sunni leaders throughout the country. AQI, brought back to life as the Islamic State, expanded in northern and western Iraq and quickly found a receptive audience among marginalized Sunnis. In short order, the progress that had resulted from the Awakening fell apart. Malkasian draws many lessons from Anbar. Chief among them, the most stunning of victories may not last. The fact that the leading model of success fell apart severely damages the idea that the United States can send the military to a country for a few years and create lasting peace. Even the most successful example was bound to deeper social, sectarian, and religious forces insensitive to temporary boots on the ground. From today's perspective, rather than decisive success, Anbar exemplifies how intervention itself is a costly, long-term project. The most brilliant victory could not escape this wisdom.

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Author

Carter Malkasian
Carter Malkasian
Author · 4 books
Dr. Carter Malkasian leads the Stability and Development Program at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). In late 2007 and again in early 2008, he led a team that advised Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in eastern Afghanistan. Previously assigned to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as an advisor on counterinsurgency, he deployed for the war in Iraq from February to May 2003, February 2004 to February 2005, and February 2006 to August 2006. Most of that time was spent in Al Anbar province. Dr. Malkasian’s most recent publication is a co-edited book (with Daniel Marston of Royal Military Academy Sandhurst), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. His other books include: A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (2002) and The Korean War, 1950-1953 (2001). His journal publications include: “Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar,” Joint Force Quarterly; “A Thin Blue Line in the Sand,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas; “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah,” Journal of Strategic Studies; “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies; and “Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition,” Journal of Military History. Dr. Malkasian holds a doctorate in the history of war from Oxford University.
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