Leavenworth Papers
Series · 20
books · 1656-2012
Books in series
#1
The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76
1979
In June 1979, the Combat Studies institute was formed within the US Army Command and General Staff College. Among its several missions, the institute is charged by the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, to undertake historical research into problems having a bearing upon the concerns of the modern Army and to disseminate research throughout the Army. Major Robert A. Doughty’s, US Army Tactical Doctrine, 7946-76, is the first of a series the Leavenworth Papers to be published under the auspices Review.
It is fitting that this inaugural study of the Combat Studies the fruits of this The Evolution of of studies called of the Military Institute should focus upon the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before.
Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army’s doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development. This study is the first step along the road.
#3
"Not War But Like War"
The American Intervention in Lebanon
1981
This latest Leavenworth Paper examines the U.S. military intervention in the 1958 Lebanese political crisis. By focusing on a relatively recent Army experience in planning and conducting a major contingency operation, the study illuminates the complexity of military planning and the incongruity between plans and performance. This focus promotes the value of the historical perspective in dealing with contemporary military subjects and provides a timely opportunity to apply the lessons of the past.
#4
The Dynamics of Doctrine
The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War
1981
{ 19.78 x 26.13 cms} Leather Binding on Spine and Corners with Golden Leaf Printing on round Spine (extra customization on request like complete leather, Golden Screen printing in Front, Color Leather, Colored book etc.) Reprinted in 2013 with the help of original edition published long back [1981]. This book is printed in black & white, sewing binding for longer life, printed on high quality Paper, re-sized as per Current standards, professionally processed without changing its contents. As these are old books, we processed each page manually and make them readable but in some cases some pages which are blur or missing or black spots. If it is multi volume set, then it is only single volume, if you wish to order a specific or all the volumes you may contact us. We expect that you will understand our compulsion in these books. We found this book important for the readers who want to know more about our old treasure so we brought it back to the shelves. Hope you will like it and give your comments and suggestions. - English, Pages 86. EXTRA 10 DAYS APART FROM THE NORMAL SHIPPING PERIOD WILL BE REQUIRED FOR LEATHER BOUND BOOKS. COMPLETE LEATHER WILL COST YOU EXTRA US$ 25 APART FROM THE LEATHER BOUND BOOKS. {FOLIO EDITION IS ALSO AVAILABLE.} Complete The dynamics of doctrine the changes in German tactical doctrine during the First World War 1981 Timothy T. Lupfer
#5
Fighting the Russians in Winter
Three Case Studies
2011
Although the Russian war plans of both Napoleon and Hitler miscarried seriously in terms of casualties and materiel even prior to the onset of winter, "General Winter" was indeed a major contributor to the magnitude of their subsequent problems and casualties. No consideration of warfare in European Russia can ignore the harshness of that region's climate, and the successful war planner must adapt to those conditions or risk emulating their powerful predecessors. Fighting the Russians in Three Case Studies cites three examples drawn from history to illustrate the nature of a winter war in The undeclared Allied-Soviet War in Northern Russia in 1918-1919; The destruction of the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division in the Winter War against Finland; Aspects of Nazi-Soviet Warfare in 1941-1942. Two of these three campaigns clearly demonstrated the superiority of the defense over the offense, while the Winter War, although the 44th Division fought defensively, it was as part of the overall Soviet strategic offensive. Given the lessons learned by both sides in the 1918-1919 campaign - lessons vitiated in that conflict due to lack of adequate supplies and troops - it is remarkable that the same issues, such as lack of adequate clothing and lubricants, reoccurred in 1941-1942. All three case studies in "Fighting the Russians in Winter" illustrate the need for thorough preparations, specialized training, and appropriate equipment for any winter operations in such an environment. They also present dramatic proof of the cost of ignoring those lessons. Originally published in 1981: 60 p. maps. ill.
#6
Soviet Night Operations in World War II
2012
One of the more perplexing problems contemporary military planners face is that of conducting night operations. Psychologically, night has always been a realm of the unknown and the uncertain, magnified by imagination. While dealing with this psychological barrier to the conduct of battle at night, the soldier must also cope with a myriad of more tangible problems. Coordination of forces in battle at night tests the mettle of the most proficient leader and the most highly trained force. Yet, the fact is that those armies that can operate successfully at night have a marked advantage over adversaries who cannot Thus study examines the extensive experiences of the Soviet Army as it struggled to master the night. Driven by necessity to operate in the relative safety of darkness, the Soviet Army in World War II learned to capitalize on night operations and to exploit that capability in its quest for victory over the German Army. The Soviets have not forgotten that experience, and since the war, they have emphasized the advantages of night combat. As they train for night operations, they closely study the experiences of World War II in the belief that certain basic techniques and conditions of battle transcend time and the vagaries of technological change. Contemporary technology offers the soldier a growing array of equipment with which to overcome the barriers of darkness. An impulsive soldier might embrace new technology and consider the problems associated with operating at night overcome. A more thoughtful soldier will find that new tools and advanced technology provide only partial solutions and that experience, study, and practice cannot be ignored if one is to understand the essence of night combat. I hope that this Leavenworth Paper will add to the reservoir of understanding the soldier needs to deal successfully with the complexities of night operations. JACK N. MERRITT Lieutenant General, USA Commanding
#7
August Storm
The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria
1983
\[Includes 15 tables, 1 tables, 26 maps\]
In August 1945, only three months after the rumble of gunfire had subsided in Europe, Soviet armies launched massive attacks on Japanese forces in Manchuria. In a lightning campaign that lasted but ten days, Soviet forces ruptured Japanese defenses on a 4,000-kilometer front, paralyzed Japanese command and control, and plunged through 450 kilometers of forbidding terrain into the heartland of Manchuria. Effective Soviet cover and deception masked the scale of offensive preparations and produced strategic surprise. Imaginative tailoring of units to terrain, flexible combat formations, and bold maneuvers by armor-heavy, task-organized forward detachments and mobile groups produced operational and tactical surprise and, ultimately, rapid and total Soviet victory.
For the Soviet Army, the Manchurian offensive was a true postgraduate combat exercise. The Soviets had to display all the operational and tactical techniques they had learned in four years of bitter fighting in the west. Though the offensive culminated an education, it also emerged as a clear case study of how a nation successfully begins a war in a race against the clock arid not only against an enemy, but also against hindering terrain.
Soviet military historians and theorists have recently focused on the Manchurian offensive, a theater case study characterized by deep mobile operations on a broad front designed to pre-empt and overcome defenses. Because these characteristics appear relevant to current theater operations, the Soviets study the more prominent operational and tactical techniques used in Manchuria in 1945. What is of obvious interest to the Soviet military professional should be of interest to the U.S. officer as well.
#8
August Storm
Soviet Tactical And Operational Combat In Manchuria, 1945
1983
\[Includes 19 tables, 7 figures, 41 maps\]
To be successful, a strategic military operation requires careful planning and meticulous execution. History applauds the commander who orchestrates the operation, and major subordinate commanders share in the glory. In reality, however, commanders and soldiers at the operational and tactical levels play an even more critical role in achieving battlefield success. History often accords them little attention.
Practitioners of war must study war at all levels. An understanding of the strategic aspects of military operations is essential in order to provide a context for a more detailed and equally critical understanding of precise operational and tactical techniques. Few officers practice war at the strategic level. The majority wrestle with the myriad of problems associated with implementing those strategic plans.
Leavenworth Paper no. 8. through the medium of detailed case studies, examines the operational and tactical aspects of a major strategic operation—the Soviet offensive m Manchuria in 1945. The case studies, which involve army, corps, division, regimental, and battalion operations, focus on the many problems commanders and soldiers at that level face. Constrained by time, a desperate enemy, rugged terrain, and severe climatic conditions—the realities of war—Soviet commanders devised find implemented techniques that produced victory. This paper highlights those techniques in the knowledge that Soviet theorists have likewise studied them in detail, both historically and in a contemporary context.
#10
Chemical Warfare in World War I
The American Experience, 1917-1918
1984
This book chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This book was prepared by the USAR Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAR Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. In fulfilling the needs of the USAR, this book also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed. Carl E. Vuono Lieutenant General, USA Commandant
#11
Rangers
Selected Combat Operations in World War II
1985
This book contains pictures, maps, footnotes, and a bibliography.
“The U.S. Army Ranger has a proud heritage dating from Rogers’ Rangers to the present, but at no time was the Rangers’ legacy more evident than during the heyday of World War II. Conceived under the guidance of then Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, the Rangers were selectively recruited and trained for operations such as raids, infiltrations, and specialized combat. In reality, their utilization was somewhat more varied, thus providing one of the themes for this Leaven-worth Paper.
“The five Ranger operations recounted in this paper depict the Rangers in a variety of combat roles. Each operation provided unique challenges to the Ranger Force, and each produced different results. Created for one purpose, often used and misused for others, the Ranger organization fluctuated throughout the war. The longer the Ranger Force remained in a theater of operations, the heavier it became and the more likely it was to be employed in a conventional role. The Ranger leadership constantly struggled with organizational problems in its attempts to balance the need for additional firepower and combat power with the need to retain its identity as a right, mobile, flexible strike force.
“The evolutional process depicted in this paper illustrates the difficulties encountered by military units that are given inappropriate missions for their force capability. When the Rangers were utilized in their designed roles in appropriate missions and within organizational constraints, they achieved outstanding successes. When these organizational constraints were ignored and Rangers were used in a conventional role, disaster resulted as at Cisterna when the Rangers were unable to counter the German armor threat.
“In Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, Dr. Michael J. King presents a multi-faceted work that blends battle narrative, operational lessons, and doctrinal considerations into a paper that provides a useful historical perspective into Ranger operations, The relevance of these historical case studies to current and future elite force operations is evident, Force designers, doctrine writers, and commanders will greatly profit from the valuable information contained in this Leavenworth Paper. One needs only to study these lessons and apply them.”
About the author: Dr. Michael J. King is a graduate of De Paul University and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Northern Illinois University. He is also a graduate of the US. Army Airborne and Ranger Schools and served as a platoon leader and rifle company executive officer in the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, in Germany. While in the U.S. Army Reserve, he served as S2 of the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He is the author of William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography. Dr. King completed the research for this Leavenworth Paper while a Teaching Fellow at the Combat Studies Institute.
Chapters include: Origin of the Rangers; Djebel el Ank; Porto Empedocle; Cisterna; Zerf; Cabanatuan.
#13
Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950
2012
Dr. William Glenn Robertson examines the theory and practice of U.S. counterattack theory as it existed during the defense of the Pusan Perimeter in the initial phases of the Korean War. Specifically, this study focuses on the 24th Infantry Division's defense of the Naktong River in August 1950 and on the key role that counterattacks played in the defense.
Relying on such primary source materials as unit journals, messages, and war diaries, Dr. Robertson analyses how well an infantry division, skeletonized by peacetime budget constraints and debilitated by heavy fighting, applied doctrine to the perilous situation in which it found itself in Korea. He concludes that, although written for heavy divisions, official doctrine both for defense and counterattack was sound, even for a unit that had been reduced essentially to a light infantry division. The difficulties encountered by the 24th Division in August can be attributed in part to the fact that it failed to follow basic tenets of that doctrine, especially those calling for centralized command and control, timely analysis of intelligence, and coordinated counterattacks on enemy flanks. The line held, but the issue was long in doubt.
#14
Dragon Operations
Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965
1988
Book by Odom, Thomas P
#15
Power Pack
U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966
1988
First published in 1988, this study describes a military operation characterized by multiple - service participation. The author's contribution provides an important analysis of the interplay between state craft and military operational planning and execution. The study addresses not only questions of planning and deployment but the course of the intervention from the landing of marines to evacuate American citizens, through the commitment of the 82d Airborne Division to separate the combatants in the Dominican civil war, to the establishment of the ad hoc Inter- American Peace Force, the First hemispheric military organization of its kind. The United States intervention in the Dominican Republic was successful. It accomplished the mission of preventing a Communist takeover and providing the military presence to make a political settlement possible. Nevertheless, Power Pack experienced its share of problems associated with outdated operations plans, poor communications and coordination, hasty planning, and inadequate staff and facilities. This study's true value lies in the identification of these problems in an effort to understand why they occurred and to prevent their recurrence.
#16
Deciding What Has to Be Done
General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations
1988
This study provides more than just a background to current doctrine. It demonstrates that a well-conceived doctrine is critical to the Army and the nation, describes why doctrine is so difficult to formulate, places doctrine at the center of peacetime professionalism, and admonishes the Army not to become complacent about the contents of its field manuals.
Leavenworth Paper No. 16 illuminates the problems inherent in creating new doctrine and provides readers with a better understanding of our Army's vigilance concerning doctrine.
#17
The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation
Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic 1944
1989
Half a century after the end of World War II, many of the important battles of the Eastern Front have not been thoroughly researched by Western military historians.
Major James F. Gebhardt, a Soviet foreign area officer, describes a battle that has remained virtually unknown in the English-speaking world. The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation has remained obscure partly because it was fought on the northern flank of the Soviet German front - away from major centers of population, industry, or government.
The German and Soviet generals who fought this battle are also not as well known to the American officer corps as the more famous and fashionable Guderian, Rommel, Manstein, or Zhukov. In Western general histories of the Soviet-German war, this operation normally receives one or two sentences and a single, minuscule map arrow - if it is mentioned at all. The comprehensive accounts of the battle that do exist are principally in Russian-language sources and, therefore, are inaccessible to most Western-readers.
Primarily using Soviet sources, Major Gebhardt has written a comprehensive study of the 1944 Soviet offensive conducted to clear German forces from the approaches to Murmansk. Its focus is at the operational level of war, with emphasis on the peculiar demands of arctic terrain on commanders and soldiers. Major Gebhardt also used German war diary reports to add clarity and perspective to the Soviet accounts.This book contains something for almost every reader. It describes the employment on arctic terrain of light infantry, infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, logistic support, air power, naval infantry (Soviet marines), amphibious forces, and special-purpose forces.
In three weeks of often intense fighting, supported by units of the Northern Fleet, the Red Army inflicted significant personnel and material losses on the German force and drove it from Soviet and northern Norwegian territory. This operational account provides the opportunity to review the lessons
#18
Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April--June 1945
1990
Originally published in 1990 by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. From April to June 1945, U.S. and Imperial Japanese Army (lJA) forces fought fiercely for control of the island of Okinawa. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHO) had determined after U.S. strikes on Truk in February 1944 that sooner or later the Americans would seize Okinawa as a forward base for the invasion of Japan. The IJA 32d Army was established on Okinawa in March 1944 to forestall this eventuality and immediately faced the challenge of how to deal not only with superior numbers of U.S. troops but also with overwhelming American firepower by air, land, and sea. The 32d Army's innovative staff had one year in which to invent and implement a new form of underground warfare that would be proof against the Americans' abundant bombs and tanks. Their methods were devised in the field in defiancé both of the IJA's traditional light infantry doctrine and of IGHO's preoccupation with air power.
#19
Scenes from an Unfinished War
Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969
1991
Low-intensity conflict (LIC) often has been viewed as the wrong kind of warfare for the American military, dating back to the war in Vietnam and extending to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the American perspective, LIC occurs when the U.S. military must seek limited aims with a relatively modest number of available regular forces, as opposed to the larger commitments that bring into play the full panoply of advanced technology and massive commitments of troops. Yet despite the conventional view, U.S. forces have achieved success in LIC, albeit "under the radar" and with credit largely assigned to allied forces, in a number of counterguerrilla wars in the 1960s. "Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969" focuses on what the author calls the Second Korean conflict, which flared up in November 1966 and sputtered to an ill-defined halt more than three years later. During that time, North Korean special operations teams had challenged the U.S. and its South Korean allies in every category of low-intensity conflict - small-scale skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, spectacular terrorist strikes, attempts to foment a viable insurgency in the South, and even the seizure of the USS Pueblo - and failed. This book offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of LIC. He and his Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that defanged North Korea's aggressive campaign. According to the convincing argument made by "Scenes from an Unfinished War", because the U.S. successfully fought the "wrong kind" of war, it likely blocked another kind of wrong war - a land war in Asia. The Second Korean Conflict serves as a corrective to assumptions about the American military's abilities to formulate and execute a winning counterinsurgency strategy. Originally published in 1991. 180 pages. maps. ill.
#20
Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan
1993
First published in 1983 this detailed study has only now been made generally available. The Russians have a long history of fighting what are now called unconventional wars. Certainly since the 18th Century, and more recently in Afghanistan and Chechnia. The early wars were fought in the Caucasus. Fighting in that region started in earnest in the early 19th Century and continued to the late 1840s. Unrest continued in the region thereafter with major uprisings in the 1870s and also following the 1917 Revolution. It continues today in the Chechnia region. As the Russian Empire expanded Russian forces dominated the Kazahk region and undertook a series of campaigns in the area between the Caspian and Aral Sea. This culminated in the assault on Khiva in 1873 and the operations in 1880-1 on the Persian border, by then the Empire was on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan. After the Revolution the Red Army conducted a long campaign in the area north of the border with Afghanistan against the Basmachis Central Asian resistance. The Soviet operations started in 1918 and the last rumblings of resistance was finally quelled in 1933, though no serious fighting took place after 1924. The Soviets had considerable experience in the conduct of and fighting against, insurgency warfare. Prior to World War II it was either suppressing or encouraging such wars on its Asian frontiers. In World War II it organised activities behind the German line in Russia as well as supporting resistance and partisan movements in eastern and central Europe. After World War II it had to deal with resistance in the Ukraine and other areas of the Soviet Union that had been liberated from German occupation. Since World War II it encouraged, supplied and trained numerous participants in insurgent wars from the large scale such as Vietnam to the insignificant. In 1979, after the Soviet military intervention in Kabul, the Red Army allowed itself to become involved in an unwinnable war. This despite the Soviet experience in such fighting that extended back to the Revolution. Furthermore their conduct of operations demonstrated their failure to comprehend how such a war should be fought.
#21
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
The Albatross of Decisive Victory
1996
The Six Day War of June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Force (IDF) achieve a decisive military victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while sustaining relatively few casualties. Despite the subsequent image of Israel as a regional military superpower, Egypt attacked again in 1973, eventually resulting in a peace treaty that promised to return the entire Sinai to Egypt. It is the contention of "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory" that the IDF's dramatic 1967 victory unconsciously created an albatross in the form of a belief in its own invulnerability coupled with the belief that Egypt would perform as poorly in the next war as it had in this one. In a spirit of overconfidence, Israel prepared to fight its next war just as it had in 1967. The 1973 attack caught Israel off guard, the Egyptians performed much better than expected, and, even after the IDF recovered from its initial stumbles, Egypt was by no means out of the game militarily. Once a cease-fire took effect, the Israelis quickly grasped how ill prepared their army had been for war and the resultant three weeks of hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties. As the author notes, "If the United States had experienced equivalent losses in the Vietnam War, it would have suffered 200,000 American dead - a figure four times the actual number." Given this situation, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat quickly proposed a negotiated peace, which a suddenly war-weary Israeli public warily accepted. Both as an incisive narrative of the 1973 war and an analysis of the self-deception and overconfidence that too decisive a victory can breed, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" is an invaluable work of scholarship as well as a cautionary tale for students and practitioners of modern warfare. Orginally published in 1996: 104 p. maps. ill.
#22
Moving the Enemy
Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign
1656
This study examines the Huai Hai Campaign as an example of operational-level warfare as described in the 2001 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. It also examines the campaign from the perspective of the military thought contained in the ancient Chinese military classic, The Art of War, and the Communist operational doctrine in effect at the time of the campaign. What emerges is a picture of what operational art can contribute to warfare. Communist commanders consistently maintained an awareness of the war situation as a whole and continually ensured that the objectives of their military operations were linked to strategic goals. The study shows that Su Yu, the acting commander of the East China Field Army, was an excellent practitioner of operational art and a general who was willing to speak out against military operations that would not contribute to achieving political, social, or economic goals. The study contains background material on the Communist mili-tary forces that fought the campaign and the commanders who led them in the field. Using messages sent between various Communist headquarters, the study describes and analyzes the operational decisions that were made. Much of this material has not appeared before in English. This enables readers to gain a fresh appreciation for the professional competence of military men who were among the founding generation of the People's Liberation Army and later played significant roles in building the military strength of the People's Republic of China.
#23
Third War
Irregular Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-1865
2012
Includes maps. Combat Studies Institute Leavenworth Paper series, number 23. From the foreword: "Third War offers a lucid and well-researched analysis of irregular warfare during the American Civil War. Dr. Martin's focus on insurgent operations in the western border region brings fresh insights to this area of study. Moreover, the history of insurgency in these western states offers a greater understanding of irregular warfare to those who may be tasked with mounting counterinsurgency operations in the not so distant future."
Authors
George W. Gawrych
Author · 2 books
George Walter Gawrych
U.S. Department of the Army
Author · 5 books
The Department of the Army (DA) is one of the three military departments within the Department of Defense of the United States of America. The Department of the Army is the Federal Government agency within which the United States Army is organized, and it is led by the Secretary of the Army who has statutory authority 10 U.S.C. § 3013 to conduct its affairs and to prescribe regulations for its government, subject to the limits of the law, and the directions of the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Secretary of the Army is a civilian official appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The highest-ranking military officer in the department is the Chief of Staff of the Army, who is also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other senior officials of the Department are the Under Secretary of the Army (principal deputy to the Secretary) and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (principal deputy to the Chief of Staff.) The Department of War was originally formed in 1789 as an Executive Department of the United States, and was renamed by the National Security Act of 1947 to the Department of the Army on September 18, 1947. By amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 in 1949, the Department of the Army was transformed to its present-day status.
Daniel P. Bolger
Author · 8 books
Daniel P. Bolger of Aurora, Illinois is an author, historian, and retired Lieutenant General (promoted 21 May 2010) of the United States Army. He currently holds a special faculty appointment in the Department of History at North Carolina State University, where he teaches military history. Lt. Gen. Bolger retired in 2013 from the Army. During his 35 years of service, he earned five Bronze Star Medals (one for valor) and the Combat Action Badge. His notable military commands included serving as Commanding General of the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan and Commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (2011-2013); Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas (deployed to Baghdad, 2009-2010); the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq (2005–06); and U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. He is also the author of books, such as Why We Lost, Americans at War, The Battle for Hunger Hill, and Death Ground.
David M. Glantz
Author · 32 books
David M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963. He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh. After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel. In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union. A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history. Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources. Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus. He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Robert A. Doughty
Author · 6 books
Brigadier General Robert Allan Doughty, USA (Ret.), is an American military historian, educator and retired career military officer.
William Glenn Robertson
Author · 3 books
William Glenn Robertson received his Ph.D from the University of Virginia in 1975. After a ten-year career in academic institutions in Virginia, New Mexico and Colorado, he joined the faculty of the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1981, where he worked for thirty years.
