A new point of view, based on discovered documents: The three day delay in the capture of the Waal Bridge in Nijmegen was unnecessary and seriously contributed to the failure of operation “Market Garden”. For the first time a factual account of the decisive first twenty-four hours of fighting by the 82nd Airborne Division around Nijmegen. “Lost at Nijmegen” is a well-founded book with a lot of quotes and footnotes. Somehow, the importance of the three day delay is usually “overlooked” in the evaluation of operation “Market Garden”. If the Waal Bridge had been secured, when British XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen on the 19th of September, they would have had 48 hours to relieve their compatriots at Arnhem. The three day delay in the capture of the Waal Bridge is generally explained as follows: the necessary quick capture of the Waal Bridge failed because the commander of the 508 PIR (Parachute Infantry Regiment) – designated to capture the Waal Bridge – misunderstood pre-jump orders given by General Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. Authentic documents however prove that in fact no pre-jump orders were issued, as claimed by General Gavin. There is an official statement in which General Gavin admits that he alone was responsible for the shift in priority from capturing the Waal Bridge to defending the Groesbeek Heights. As a direct result the 508 PIR landed without offensive orders, disabling the key weapon of General Gavin: the element of surprise. Based on a lot of original material in Dutch and American archives, the author meticulously describes the combat actions of the 504 and 508 PIR. An unknown missed opportunity is that “G” Company was already in a perfect assault position – around 2000 on the 17th of September – only a mile from the Waal Bridge, but orders strictly prohibited own initiative. Twelve hours later they – at last – attacked the Waal Bridge. Furthermore, the American strength is analysed and so is the German threat toward the landing zones on the 18th of September; the German attack was only local and there was no need for the withdrawal of the three companies in Nijmegen who were making good progress in capturing the Waal Bridge. The achievements of the Dutch are not forgotten; the last three days of Jan Van Hoof are described in detail and so are the actions of Captain Bestebreurtje and volunteer Agardus Leegsma. Background information, uncovered maps and enlightening overviews complete the book. I hope that future readers of "Lost at Nijmegen" enjoy the book as much as I did creating it!