Operation HOREV – the Israeli winter offensive from December 1948 until January 1949 – practically ended Israel’s War for Independence (also known as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War), with an Israeli victory that forced Egypt to seek ceasefire and to negotiate a settlement with the fledgling nation. From HOREV Day 1 on 23 December 1948 until HOREV Day 16 on 7 January 1949, this title presents Israeli Air Force missions during Operation HOREV in heretofore unseen depth and detail. This title chronicles Israeli Air Force sorties during Operation HOREV; from Austers and Pipers to C-46s and C-47s; from Messerschmitts, Spitfires and P-51s to Beaufighters and B-17s; Israel Air Force operations are detailed spanning the timeline of the conflict down to every unearthed sortie in depth, and shown in a way that Israeli Air Force operations during Operation HOREV had never been presented before. This level of detail has been made possible by extensive use of contemporary documentation. The detailed text is supported by numerous photographs and color profiles. Middle East@War - following on from our highly successful Africa@War series, Middle East@War replicates the same format - concise, incisive text, rare images and high quality color artwork providing fresh accounts of both well-known and more esoteric aspects of conflict in this part of the world since 1945.

Sixty years since the tripartite aggression of France, Great Britain and Israel against Egypt, this is the first account about Egyptian military operations during the Suez War of 1956 (or Suez Crisis, as it is known in the West). Based on research with the help of official Egyptian documentation and recollections of crucial participants, this book provides an unique and exclusive insight into the other side of a war that many consider has marked the end of the British Empire . From the Western point of view, the situation is usually explained in quite simple terms: in retaliation for President Gamal Abdel Nasser s nationalization of the Universal Suez Canal Company - and thus the strategically important waterway of the Suez Canal - France and Great Britain (operating in concert with Israel) launched the operation codenamed 'Musketeer'. Divided into three phases, each shaded into the other; this aimed at obliterating the Egyptian Air Force, occupying the whole of the Suez Canal and toppling Nasser s government. From the Egyptian point of view, backgrounds were much more complex than this. Striving to modernize the country, a new and inexperienced government in Cairo launched a number of major projects, including one for the construction of a gigantic Asswan Dam on the Nile. The only Western power ready to help finance this project, the USA conditioned its support with basing rights for its military. With the last British soldiers still about to leave the country - and thus end Egypt s occupation by foreign powers for the first time in 2,000 years - Nasser found this unacceptable. Around the same time, Egypt found itself under pressure from Israeli raids against border posts on the Sinai. Left without a solution, Cairo decided to nationalize the Suez Canal in order to finance the Aswan Dam project, but also to start purchasing arms from the Soviet Union. In an attempt to bolster Egyptian defenses without antagonizing Western powers, Nasser concluded the so-called Czech Arms deal with Moscow - resulting in the acquisition of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia. Little known in Cairo at the time, such moves tripped several red lines in Israel and in the West - in turn prompting aggression that culminated in a war. Wings over Sinai is, first and foremost, an account of the battle for survival of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF). Caught in the middle of conversion to Soviet-types, this proved more than a match for Israel, but were hopelessly ill-prepared to face the military might of Great Britain and France too. Sustained, days-long air strikes on Egyptian air bases caused heavy damage, but were nowhere near as crippling as the losses usually claimed and assessed by the British, French and Israelis. The EAF not only survived that conflict in quite a good order, but also quickly recovered. This story is told against the backdrop of the fighting on the ground and the air and naval invasion by British and French forces. Richly illustrated with plenty of new and previously unpublished photographs, maps (and 15 color profiles), this action-packed volume is illustrates all aspects of camouflage, markings and various equipment of British and Soviet origin in Egyptian military service as of 1956."

Following a protracted research and development phase, Mikoyan Gurevich's MiG-23 finally entered service with the former Soviet Air Force in the early 1970s. Almost immediately, a number of foreign customers pressed Moscow for deliveries of this long-overdue type, expected to succeed the popular MiG-21 as a standard interceptor. Correspondingly, large numbers of MiG-23 interceptors and fighter-bombers were exported to five major Arab air forces in the mid-1970s. This is a detailed history of the operational service of this Soviet-manufactured interceptor and its fighter-bomber variants in service with Algerian, Egyptian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Syrian air forces, since 1974. While Egypt purchased only a handful before its final break with Moscow, and Algeria limited related acquisitions, Iraq, Libya and Syria continued purchasing advanced variants in significant numbers through the 1980s. The units operating MiG-23s were soon transformed into the backbone of the military services in question, and they saw combat service in a number of intensive military conflicts. In the 1980s, they fought against Israeli jets over Lebanon, against the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq War, and confronted US Navy's F-14s on numerous occasions off Libya. In 1991 Iraqi MiG-23s were deployed in combat against the US-led coalition's F-15s. Indeed, in Syria, different versions of MiG-23 continue flying combat operations today. Illustrated with over 110 photographs - many of these never published before -color profiles and a dozen maps, this volume provides a unique point of reference, revealing much detail about camouflage patterns, unit insignia and aircraft markings.

Pursuing a policy of social revolution, national liberation, and non-alignment, Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito became involved in the Middle East in the mid-1950s. Combined with some initial interest in economic and military assistance, this involvement found a positive reception among several Arab states, foremost Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Close personal ties between Tito and Nasser significantly contributed to the deployment of a contingent from the Yugoslav Popular Army (JNA) within the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt, following the Suez War of 1956. Established in a hurry and deployed to Egypt in late November 1956, the JNA’s part of the UNEF consisted of a reinforced reconnaissance battalion. The unit was manned by conscript soldiers and equipped with vehicles provided by the USA within the frame of the Mutual Defence Assistance Program (MDAP). The story of the unit’s difficult task of entering the Sinai Peninsula right on the heels of withdrawing Israeli forces is the centerpiece of this book. While warmly welcomed by the local inhabitants, through late 1956 and all of 1957, the JNA contingent had the difficult task of reaching the demarcation lines, establishing observation posts, and making sure the cease-fire would be respected by all of the belligerents. For a force that understood itself to have a national-liberation and revolutionary role, rather than being an expeditionary military, the Yugoslav Popular Army thus went through a particularly unusual experience. The mission of the JNA’s contingent with the UNEF on the Sinai came to a sudden end during the crisis leading to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli squeezed between the advancing Israeli forces, it had to be quickly evacuated, leaving all its heavy equipment and vehicles behind. Prepared with help of the original documentation from a host of archival sources of the former JNA, the book Yugoslav UNEF Contingent focuses foremost on the deployment immediately after the Suez Crisis of 1956. Providing detailed coverage of the much underreported closing chapter of that conflict, it is illustrated by more than 150 original photographs, most of which have never been published before.

This book provides an overview of the military forces of Muscat & Oman and successor State of Oman. Britain and Oman have had various treaties over several centuries brought closer with Britain's involvement in creating the Sultan's Armed Forces. The book covers the Muscat Armed Forces and the Sultan's Armed Forces of Oman, Dhofar Force, plus selected paramilitary forces and the Royal Oman Police Force. The narrative includes regimental and corps histories, and selected military operations. The book also details the contribution made by British seconded and contract personnel who have shaped these forces from the 1920s to the present, through forming, leading, advising and training them. Maps of the areas concerned are provided, along with a glossary of terms and a comprehensive time chart showing the dates of formation and disbandment of units, and if they were merged or reformed into new units. Many photographs are included showing the uniforms and a selection of badges and insignia. The work has been written by Cliff Lord and Dr Athol Yates. Cliff has had published a number of books including a history of the Armed Forces of Aden and the Protectorate, which in some respects is a lead on to this history. This book is a sister companion to The Armed Forces of the Smaller Gulf States also by Cliff Lord and Athol Yates.

The war fought in northern Oman from 1954 until the mid-1960s is almost completely forgotten. Even amongst contemporary military historians, it is considered less frequently than the subsequent – and widely published – Dhofar War. Though ‘small’, it was a conflict of crucial importance for the nation on the southeastern side of the Arab Peninsula. While usually thought to have been fought – and won – exclusively by special forces, capacity building, and training of native forces, a closer look reveals an entirely different picture. The victory and lasting peace were actually secured by a conventional military campaign dominated by offensive operations, followed by an entirely separate civilian development program. The role of special forces was overemphasized – not only in regards of their relative number of operations, but also in regards of their impact – while the insurgency was suppressed by punitive means, and the capacity building remained limited during the war. It was only once offensive operations were completed that the development program contributed to the lasting peace. This peace, in turn, would have been impossible without the conventional military campaign. As such, this ‘small’ conflict proved of crucial importance for the nation on the southeastern side of the Arab Peninsula. The War in Northern Oman provides a detailed account of the political dynamics which led to the eruption of violence, but foremost examines the use of force, the wider conventional military campaign, operations by special forces, military capacity building, and the application of soft power factors for civilian capacity building. Moreover, it emphasizes the process of reconciliation and international engagement. Based on extensive research in official documentation, and including numerous personal testimonies, this volume – richly illustrated by photographs provided by veterans – provides exclusive coverage of one of very few wars in which a grassroots insurgency suffered a clear-cut military defeat.

In October 1956 the British government, together with the French and Israelis, launched an attack on Egypt in response to President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The agreement between these three governments, the Sèvres Protocol, was a low point in British diplomacy and a factor in the ending of Prime Minister Eden’s political career. The military commanders had to plan for and launch Operation Musketeer, some 2,000 miles from the UK, while their political masters gave them only limited information on the arrangement made with France and Israel. The RAF squadrons allocated to the operation came from the UK and Germany where their jet bombers, Canberras and Valiants, were intended for nuclear war against the Warsaw Pact countries rather than conventional war with Second World War bombs in a desert environment. This account uses Cabinet Minutes, Squadron Operation Record Books, reports written by the Commander-in-Chief and personal accounts by aircrew who flew over Egypt, to detail the involvement of the RAF. When Anthony Eden took the decision to launch Operation Musketeer the RAF did not have the forces required in the Mediterranean. At short notice, squadrons had to train for high level, visual bombing using techniques that would have been familiar to Lancaster crews in the Second World War. Also, the navigation aids fitted in the bombers were those required for the European theatre, not the Egyptian desert. The RAF’s primary role was to neutralize the Egyptian Air Force by destroying aircraft and denying the EAF the use of its airfields. The bombing accuracy, as the book details, was not good but the RAF did what was asked of them and effectively removed the EAF from the battle space. If the weather had not been so good and if the EAF had been a more determined adversary, Operation Musketeer would not have come to the same successful conclusion, militarily. From the political point of view, the British involvement in Suez was a disaster. It took place at the same time as a presidential election in America and the Russian invasion of Hungary. The Anglo-French intervention and their duplicity at Sèvres came in for international condemnation and led directly to American pressure on the pound.

The Syrian Civil War experienced an entirely unexpected transformation during its first two years. It started as unrest and a series of mass demonstrations within the Syrian population in the context of wider protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, known as the Arab Spring. Unlike events in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, where oppressive governments were toppled by the end of that year, the government of Syria deployed the full force of its military, its intelligence apparatus, and paramilitary groups, launching an unprecedented crackdown that resulted in the arrest, detention and killing of many thousands. Despite its brutality, this effort it provoked mass desertions of the Syrian military and then an armed uprising. The emerging insurgency was generally successful through 2012, although failing to capture Damascus, it secured more than half of Aleppo and Homs, the provincial capital of Raqqa, and nearly all of north-eastern and north-western Syria under its control. Although propped-up by economic and military support from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, the government of Syria was nearing the brink of collapse during the first half of 2013 when, prompted by Tehran, Hezbollah – a Shi’a Islamic militant group and political party from Lebanon – entered the conflict on its side. Soon after, Hezbollah was reinforced by significant contingents of Iranian-sponsored Shi’a from Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere, followed by volunteers from Iran, including crack units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Meanwhile, already split along the lines of Syria’s complex demography, much of the insurgency transformed from a secular and non-sectarian movement into proxies of various foreign powers, foremost Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also Turkey and Kuwait. Furthermore, foreign Jihadists motivated by al-Qaida joined the fray, aiming to establish an Islamist state and clandestinely cooperating with the government, they fell upon the insurgency. Thus, an extremely complex conflict – which then not only spilled over the border into Lebanon, but had a major impact upon Iranian-Saudi relations, and relations between the West, Iran and a number of Arab countries – came into being, the outcome of which was anything but predictable. This revised edition of Syrian Conflagration draws on extensive research, including first-hand accounts, and provides a compelling overview of the first three years of the ongoing conflict in Syria. The book features 120 full-color photographs, 27 full-color artworks and four color maps.

In August 2015, the government of the Russian Federation embarked its military forces on an intervention in Syria. Ever since, there is no end of discussions about Russian military capabilities and intentions – in Syria and beyond. To many, the performance of the Russian military – and especially the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) – in this war was a clear demonstration of advanced technology, improved training, fearsome firepower, and great mobility. To others, the military operation only experienced limited success and exposed a number of weaknesses. Foremost between the latter are aircraft ill-suited to the necessities of expeditionary warfare, and a gross lack of advanced weaponry and equipment. While the military component of their intervention can only be described as providing clear evidence that the Russian military is in no condition to directly challenge the NATO’s eastern frontiers, it cannot be denied that through this action Moscow instrumented a turning point in the Syrian Civil War, and indeed one on geo-strategic plan. Organized and run in cooperation with very diverse allies – ranging from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran (IRGC), Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Kurdishan Workers Party (PKK) and a myrad of local warlords and their armed militias – their combination of intentional bombardment of insurgent-controlled parts of Syria, and indirect protection for the IRGC’s own military intervention in the country from a possible counter-intervention of the West, the Russians did succeed in saving the regime of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Through this, this campaign created an absurd precedent in newest a brutal dictatorship involved in systematic elimination of hundreds of thousands on industrial scale, and frequently with help of chemical weapons, was even made popular within circles of far-right and far-left alike around the World. In turn, the resulting flow of refugees destabilized the European Union and large parts of the NATO – two parties considered the actual primary opponents by the government in Moscow – and increased the popularity of the President Vladimir Putin to unprecedented levels. Illustrated by over 130 photographs, maps and color profiles, ‘Moscow's Game of Poker’ is providing a clear outline of the participants in this extremely complex conflict, and areas it impacts. It is providing a unique and in-depth study of Moscow’s political aims, strategy, doctrine, target selection process, military technology and tactics, day-by-day operations, and the way the Russian Federation cooperates with diverse local allies. This story is told in combination with an exclusive insight into the similar campaign run by what is left of the Syrian Arab Air Force.

Always at the forefront of Arab states when it came to the development of its armed forces and armament industry, during the 1970s Iraq embarked on an ambitious program of becoming self-sufficient in production of almost all equipment and ammunition necessary for its armed forces. Indeed, during the following decade, many of the related projects became a necessity because of the lengthy and costly war with Iran. The most ambitious – and probably the best-known – such projects were related to the production of ballistic the efforts resulted in the construction of a factory for production of rocket propellant at Hillah and another for the assembly of ballistic missiles at Fallujah. A direct result emerged in early 1988, when Iraq deployed the al-Hussein ballistic missile (an extended-range variant of the Soviet-made R-17E ‘Scud’) to strike Tehran in Iran in the course of the so-called ‘War of the Cities’. However, al-Hussein was far from being the only such project. At the time Iraqi scientists and armament designers including Nassir al-Hindawi, Rihab at-Taha, and Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash were considered some of the best in the world, they became closely involved in cooperating with Brazil, resulting in the development of the Astros 2 (a copy of the Soviet-made Luna-M artillery rocket), and then embarked on the development of such advanced designs as the Liath and Ababil, and a solid-fuel ballistic missile; the al-Samoud 2. Moreover, the Iraqis launched a project to develop indigenous early warning radar aircraft; anti-ballistic missiles; and cooperated with South Africa in the field of development of long-range artillery pieces like the GC-45 (in its GHN-45 variant). Indeed, within Project Babylon, the Iraqis cooperated with prominent Canadian artillery-expert Gerald Bull to develop the so-called ‘super gun’: a 1,000mm artillery piece expected to be able of reaching a range of 750km. Written by one of the Iraqi engineers involved, and richly illustrated with photographs (many in color) and specially commissioned artworks, al-Hussein is the first-hand account of these and many other indigenous Iraqi armament projects.

Gustavo Marón explores the downing of Argentine CL-44 over Soviet Armenia with color images and previously unseen photographs. On 18 July 1981, a Canadair CL-44D Swingtail cargo aircraft of the Argentine company Transporte Aéreo Rioplatense mysteriously disappeared over the Soviet Republic of Armenia while on a flight from Iran via Turkey in the direction of Cyprus. Four days later, on 22 July 1981, the Vremya TV broadcast in Moscow forwarded a report from the Soviet TASS news agency which stated that an aircraft of unidentified origin had entered Soviet territory in the vicinity of the Armenian city of Yerevan. According to the same release, the aircraft had ignored all calls from air traffic control and ended up crashing and burning after colliding with another Soviet aircraft. With this cryptic information began one of the most impressive and least known stories of Argentine civil the shooting down of the freighter registered as LV-JTN by the Soviet Air Defense Force (V-PVO). The episode, heavily covered up by Moscow, was part of a much larger geopolitical the clandestine transport of US-made weapons and spare parts that was taking place between Tel Aviv and Tehran by virtue of a secret agreement between the Iranian and Israeli governments. All this at a time when the former was subjected to an arms embargo in revenge for the hostage-taking that occurred in 1979 at the US Embassy in Tehran. The Islamic Republic of Iran, formed as a result of the Islamic Revolution that had broken out that same year, was an avowed enemy of Israel, whom it considered a mere Zionist regime that imposed itself in the occupation of Palestine. The Iranian religious leader Ruhollah Khomeini did not recognize the State of Israel, which he referred to simply as ‘Little Satan’. However, the Iranians desperately needed supplies of US weapons as a few months earlier, on 22 September 1980, they had been invaded by Iraq. The Israelis saw the possibility of carrying out a sideline business and thus embarked on a clandestine supply operation. The intelligence services of the Soviet Union soon became aware of the secret arms trafficking and decided to divert one of the involved aircraft into their airspace then force it to land in their territory with the aim of exposing the operation and all its protagonists. By interfering with radio communications and manipulating navigational aids, the KGB managed to divert the Argentine CL-44D from its route, with it ending up inside Soviet airspace. However, the Sukhoi Su-15TM interceptors of the V-PVO failed in their mission, and thus their ground control ordered the destruction of the target. The Soviet conspiracy of silence began after discovering that its Air Defense Force had destroyed an Argentine-flagged civil plane, with an Argentine crew, which was flying empty. Juliet Tango November explores this incident in detail and is richly illustrated with color images and previously unseen photographs.