The liberalism of fear develops its own normative standard from which political arrangements can be assessed. It does so by replacing the idealising approach to political philosophy with a non-utopian methodology, which opens a negative perspective on what is to be avoided in the political sphere, and how to detect and deal with injustice. The liberalism of fear puts cruelty first. In contrast to orthodox liberal arguments that aim at a summum bonum or common good, Shklar advocated a liberalism of fear, which holds in its sights the summum malum ‒ cruelty. Avoiding cruelty, and the suffering it causes, is the chief aim, so liberalism of fear seeks to create a sort of political order which prevents the worst abuses of government. This entails the thought that, limited government and the control of unequally divided political power, constitute the minimal condition without which freedom in unimaginable. The fear of cruelty is a sort of core intuition that drives the liberal; it is not itself an argument. In order to secure liberalism, the fear of cruelty must be made a ‘basic norm’ and universalized. Shklar’s liberalism is thus wedded to democracy and equal rights as a means of banishing cruelty. *Classic essay “The Liberalism of Fear” by Judith Shklar (published in: Liberalism and the Moral Life, Harvard University Press 1989.)