This classic study examines the deployment of U.S. naval vessels in European and Near Eastern waters from the end of the Civil War until the United States declared war in April 1917. Initially these ships were employed to visit various ports from the Baltic Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and Constantinople (today Istanbul), for the primary purpose of showing the flag. From the 1890s on, most of the need for the presence of the American warships occurred in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Unrest in the Ottoman Empire and particularly the Muslim hostility and threats to Armenians led to calls for protection. This would continue into the years of World War I. In 1905, the Navy Department ended the permanent stationing of a squadron in European waters. From then until the U.S. declaration of war in 1917, individual ships, detached units, and special squadrons were at times deployed in European waters. In 1908, the converted yacht Scorpion was sent as station ship (stationnaire) to Constantinople where she would remain, operating in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea until 1928. Upon the outbreak of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson ordered cruisers to northern European waters and the Mediterranean to protect American interests. These warships, however, did more than protect American interests. They would evacuate thousands of refugees, American tourists, Armenians, Jews, and Italians after Italy entered the conflict on the side of the Allies.

Crisis at Sea is the first comprehensive history of the United States Navy in European waters during World War I. Drawing on vast American, British, German, French, and Italian sources, the author presents the U.S. Naval experience as America moved into the modern age of naval warfare. Not limited to an operations account of naval battles and strategies, this volume—the second in a series—examines diplomatic policies, cabinet decisions, logistics, the home front, support systems, and shipbuilding to illustrate the complexity and enormity of America's naval participation in World War I. This is a thorough treatment of not only the events but also the personalities of the war, with particular attention to the difficulties they faced. The book reveals penetrating insights into the United States' relations in the world, the nation's unpreparedness for such a war, the limits imposed on the Navy by the cabinet, and the unexpected conclusion to the war. Much of the author's exhaustive research is new, such as the use of French official documents and British recollections of the American ships and sailors. This book will be the standard reference volume for libraries and serious scholars with a special interest in World War I and in the history of warfare.

Victory Without Peace concentrates on the U.S. Navy in European and Near Eastern waters during the post-World War I era. As participants in the Versailles peace negotiations, the Navy was charged with executing the naval terms of the Armistice as well as preserving stability and peace. U.S. warships were deploying into the Near East, Baltic, Adriatic, and Northern Europe, while simultaneously withdrawing its demobilized forces from European waters. This signifies the first time the U.S. Navy contributed to peacetime efforts, setting a precedent continues today. Conversely, Congressional appropriations handicapped this deployment by demobilization, general naval policy and postwar personnel, and operating funds reductions. Though reluctant to allocate postwar assets into seemingly unimportant European and Near Eastern waters, the Navy was pressured by the State Department and the American Relief Administration’s leader, Herbert Hoover, to deploy necessary forces. Most of these were withdrawn by 1924 and the European Station assumed the traditional policy of showing the flag.