Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Series · 52
books · 1989-2020
Books in series
#2
Ideologi och strategi
svensk politik under 130 år med ett nytt EU-kapitel
1989
Swedish politics during the past 130 years - some of the major political debates analyzed using game theory.
#3
Budget Reform Politics
The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921
1989
In this 1989 book Charles Stewart analyses the development of the budgetary process in the House of Representatives between 1865 and 1921. The period began with the creation of the House Appropriations Committee and ended with the passage of the Budgetary Accounting Act. Attempts at change were closely related to societal and economic, but also to institutional, developments during this period. Both the electoral system and the national party system, as well as war and other economic crises, impacted upon the budgetary process.
#5
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
1990
This volume serves as an introduction to the new field of positive political economy and the various economic and political processes with which it is concerned. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is devoted to the dual analysis of the role of economic behavior in political processes and of political behavior and constraints in economic exchange. The field has focused on three main subjects of study: models of collective action in industrialized democracies; the organization of markets and alternative mechanisms of exchange in the Third World; and the analysis of the role of transaction costs in the development and functioning of political and economic institutions. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. In the first part of the book, two chapters are devoted to explaining the evolution of the positive political economy approach; the first chapter focusing on microfoundations and the second on macrophenomena. In the second part of the book, three chapters demonstrate applications of the approach to the analysis of various forms of economic and political organizations. In the concluding section, four chapters discuss the research programs that have developed out of four different focuses of analysis: individual decision, exchange transactions, rent-seeking and indivisibilities.
#9
The Fruits of Revolution
Property Rights, Litigation and French Agriculture, 1700–1860
1992
In The Fruits of Revolution Jean-Laurent Rosenthal investigates two central issues in French economic history: to what extent did institutions hold back agricultural development under the Old Regime, and did reforms carried out during the French Revolution significantly improve the structure of property rights in agriculture? Both questions have been the subject of much debate. Historians have touched on these issues in a number of local studies, yet they usually have been more concerned with community conflict than with economic development. Economists generally have researched the performance of the French economy without paying much attention to the impact of institutions on specific areas of the economy. This book attempts to utilize the best of both approaches: it focuses on broad questions of economic change, yet it is based on detailed archival investigations into the impact of property rights on water control.
#11
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
1995
This book explores how the political process in the United States influences the economy and how economic conditions influence electoral results. It explains how the interaction between the President and Congress lead to the formulation of macroeconomic policy and how the American voters achieve moderation by balancing the two institutions. Fluctuations in economic growth are shown to depend on the results of elections and, conversely, electoral results to depend on the state of the economy. The final chapter of the book establishes striking similarities between the American political economy and other industrial democracies.
#12
The Politics of Oligarchy
Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan
1995
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control—a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
#13
Modern Political Economy
Old Topics, New Directions
1995
Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship, although its formal split into the distinct disciplines of political science and economics in the nineteenth century has limited the study of important social issues. This volume calls for a reaffirmation of the importance of the unified study of political economy, and explores the frontiers of the interaction between politics and markets. It brings together intellectual leaders from various areas, drawing on state-of-the-art theoretical and empirical analysis from each of the underlying disciplines. Each chapter, while beginning with a survey of existing work, focuses on profitable lines of inquiry for future developments. Particular attention is devoted to fields of active current development.
#14
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Institutional Choice in the Public Sector
1995
This book uses a transactions cost approach to explain the key institutional characteristics across the public sector. It defines the distinctive governance, financing and employment arrangements that characterize the common forms of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau and the state-owned enterprise. It suggests why these forms are used to perform different administrative functions, and why legislators often leave very important decisions to be resolved at the administrative level.
#16
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change
1996
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change is a collection of nine empirical studies by fourteen scholars. Dealing with issues ranging from the evolution of secure markets in seventeenth-century England to the origins of property rights in airport slots in modern America, the contributors analyze institutions and institutional change. To make the papers accessible to a wide audience, the editors have written an introduction to each study and added three theoretical essays to the volume, including Douglass North's Nobel Prize address, that reflect their collective views as to the present and future status of institutional analysis.
#17
Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment
Comparative Studies of Telecommunications
1996
Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other public utilities. This volume argues that these high expectations may not always be met because of the way a country's institutions and systems interact.
#18
Odd Markets in Japanese History
Law and Economic Growth
1996
Employing a rational-choice approach, Professor Ramseyer studies the impact of Japanese law on economic growth in Japan. Toward that end, the author investigates the way law governed various markets, and the way that people negotiated contracts within those markets. Findings reveal that the legal system generally promoted mutually advantageous deals, and that people generally negotiated in ways that shrewdly promoted their private best interests. Whether in the markets for indentured servants, prostitutes, or marriage partners, this study reports little evidence of either age- or gender-related exploitation.
#19
The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold Coast
An Empirical Study Applying Rational Choice Theory
1996
This book explores the political process by which property rights are defined and enforced in two traditional states in colonial Ghana. The case studies within the book ask how colonial institutions transformed indigenous political and economic life; and how colonization and decolonization affected prospects for future economic development and stability in Africa. The introductory chapter outlines a theory of the transformation of property rights system while the remaining empirical chapters refine this theory through a detailed analysis of the transformation of property rights within an African context.
#23
Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
1997
This book explains why citizens sometimes comply with and sometimes disobey the demands of democratic governments. It argues that citizens are more likely to comply and even give active consent when they perceive government as procedurally fair in both decisionmaking and implementation processes and when they believe other citizens are also doing their share. The author develops her argument by exploring over two hundred years of military service policies in six democratic countries.
#24
Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State
Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South, 1865–1965
1999
Combining insights from economics, political science, and history, Professors Alston and Ferrie show how the timing and extent of the growth of the American welfare state from the Civil War until the mid-1960s was influenced by the Southern agricultural elite. Before the mechanization of Southern agriculture, the rural landed interests had an economic incentive to keep labor cheap and dependent. They accomplished this through their disproportionate political power at the local, state, and national level, which enabled them to maintain a discriminatory legal environment and prevent federal interference in labor relations.
#25
Politicians and Poachers
The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa
1999
This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The book addresses a general question: Why don't wildlife policies seem to be working? Rather than use standard explanations such as "bureaucratic inefficiency" or "corrupt dictators," the book demonstrates how politicians at all levels use wildlife policy for their own political ends, which may or may not include conservation. The book uses electoral and archival data, as well as interviews with individuals ranging from presidents to poachers to address this issue.
#26
Delegating Powers
A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
1999
In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.
#27
Industrializing English Law
Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720–1844
1996
Between 1720 and the mid-nineteenth century, the legal framework of England remained static, while the country went through an economic and social evolution known as the Industrial Revolution. This book addresses the apparent discrepancy between the developing economy of 1720-1844 and the stagnant legal framework of business organization during the same period. The book specifically focuses on the ways by which the legal-economic nexus of the period gave rise to the modern institutions of organizing business.
#29
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
2000
The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analyzing legislative votes, based on a detailed empirical analysis of Chile's legislative politics.
#30
Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia
2001
In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks—unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls "rent-seizing"—the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them.
#31
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
2001
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. The book shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos' proposal is that a problem solving model of individual behavior inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes.
#33
A Theory of the State
Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State
2001
This book models the emergence and evolution of the rule-of-law state. The protector or ruler is assumed to be self-seeking. Individuals will install a protector only after they create institutions to control him. Organized protection engenders legal institutions that enforce rights. A "state of nature" then gradually turns into a rule-of-law state. Individuals employ both the state and other third parties for enforcement. The fraction of agreements that the state enforces determines its scope. Rule-of-law states encourage market transactions and standards that facilitate trade. The larger the domain of the state's ultimate enforcer, the greater the advantage of scale economies to contracting. This force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires.
#34
Elbridge Gerry's Salamander
The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution
2002
The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively—by far—than at any previous time in our nation's history. Moreover, they changed what would legally happen should a state government fail to enact a new districting plan when one was legally required. This book provides the first detailed analysis of how judicial partisanship affected redistricting outcomes in the 1960s, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led indirectly to three fundamental changes in the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of congressional votes into seats outside the south; the abrupt increase in the apparent advantage of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the two parties' success in congressional recruitment and elections.
#35
When Majorities Fail
The Russian Parliament, 1990–1993
1998
This study of institutional failure in Russia's first democratic legislature claims that inadequate rules and a chaotic party system combined to make it nearly impossible for the legislature to pass a coherent legislative program, including a new constitution. It studies a peculiar form of chaos; cycling; that can exist in majority rule institutions when institutional rules are weak. It identifies cycling in an important institutional setting—the Russian national legislature—and shows that poor institutional design has important consequences for the consolidation of democracy in transitional countries.
#36
Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State
France and Great Britain 1688-1789
1999
Does establishing representative democracy increase commitment to repaying public debt? This book develops a new theory about the link between debt and democracy and applies it to a classic historical eighteenth century Great Britain (which had strong representative institutions and sound public finance) vs. ancien regime France (which had neither). The study asserts that whether representative institutions improve commitment depends on the opportunities for government creditors to form coalitions with other groups. It is relevant to developing country governments with implications for government policy where credibility is a concern.
#37
The Politics of Property Rights
Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929
1999
This detailed economic history of Mexico presents a theory about how rent seeking permits economic growth and explains why political instability is not necessarily correlated with economic stagnation. It is intended for historians of Latin America, scholars interested in economic development, and political scientists interested in the political foundations of growth. Hb ISBN (2003): 0-521-82067-7
#38
Appointing Central Bankers
The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union
1999
Focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve Board members, this book answers three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy via Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process—only the President or the President and the Senate? Third, how is the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process explained? The study extends the analysis of the Federal Reserve Board to the European Central bank.
#39
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
2004
Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.
#41
The Political Economy of Poland's Transition
New Firms and Reform Governments
2005
In the time span of a two-term US presidency, Poland went from an authoritarian one-party state with a faltering centrally planned economy to become a relatively stable multiparty democracy and a market economy with one of the highest GDP growth rates in Europe. A central feature of these economic and political reforms is a high rate of entry of new, domestically owned firms. This book uses detailed economic and political data to examine how these new firms contributed to the Polish transition. The authors test propositions about why some regions have more new firms than others and how the success of these new firms contributed to political constituencies that supported economically liberal parties. The book concludes by contrasting the Polish with the experiences of other transitional countries.
#42
Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil
Asia's Banking Crisis
2001
In a world where capital moves freely across national borders, developing countries have increasingly been subjected to devastating financial crises caused by the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital. How do such crises develop? This book focuses on a novel causal path: that of miscommunication. By examining the determinants of Asia's financial crisis of 1997-98, it demonstrates why developing democracies are exceptionally vulnerable to breakdowns in communication between financial officials and the chief executive and outlines the disastrous consequences of such breakdowns.
#44
Architects of Political Change
Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory
2006
This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798–1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860.
#47
The European Union Decides
2006
European legislation affects countless aspects of daily life in modern Europe but just how does the European Union make such significant legislative decisions? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and how important is the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? Using a combination of detailed evidence and theoretical rigour, this volume addresses these questions and others that are central to understanding how the EU works in practice. It focuses on the practice of day-to-day decision-making in Brussels and the interactions that take place among the Member States in the Council and among the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. A unique data set of actual Commission proposals are examined against which the authors develop, apply and test a range of explanatory models of decision-making, exemplifying how to study decision-making in other political systems using advanced theoretical tools and appropriate research design.
#48
The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina
A Transactions Cost Approach
2007
The authors have two purposes in this book, and they succeed admirably at both. They develop a general model of public policy making focused on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. They combine the tools of game theory with Williamson's transaction cost theory, North's institutional arguments, and contract theory to provide a general theory of public policy making in a comparative political economy setting. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical analyses on newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes. Mariano Tommasi (Ph.D. in Economics, University of Chicago, 1991) is Professor of Economics at Universidad de San Andres in Argentina. He is past President (2004–2005) of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association. He has published articles in journals such as American Economic Review; American Journal of Political Science; American Political Science Review; Journal of Development Economic; Journal of Monetary Economics; International Economic Review; Economics and Politics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Journal of International Economics; and the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. He has held visiting positions in Economics, Business, and Political Science at Yale, Harvard, UCLA, Tel Aviv, and various Latin American universities. He has received various fellowships and awards, including a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2006. He has been an advisor to several Latin American governments and to international organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.
#49
The Economic Vote
How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results
2008
This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts, and then test explanations for this variation derived from their theory. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.
#50
The Robust Federation
2008
The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter – for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation – and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards – including the courts, political parties, and the people – cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar’s rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness.
#52
Partisan Bonds
Political Reputations and Legislative Accountability
2010
Political scientists have long painted American voters’ dependence on partisan cues at the ballot box as a discouraging consequence of their overall ignorance about politics. Taking on this conventional wisdom, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski advances the provocative theory that voters instead rely on these cues because party brand names provide credible information about how politicians are likely to act in office, despite the weakness of formal party organization in the United States. Among the important empirical implications of his theory, which he carefully supports with rigorous data analysis, are that voter uncertainty about a party’s issue positions varies with the level of party unity it exhibits in government, that party preferences in the electorate are strongest among the most certain voters, and that party brand names have meaningful consequences for the electoral strategies of party leaders and individual candidates for office.
#53
The Limits of Judicial Independence
2006
This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, as well as existing research, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward, and judicial decisions. This evidence demonstrates that Court-curbing is driven primarily by public opposition to the Court, and that the Court responds to those proposals by engaging in self-restraint and moderating its decisions.
#54
Political Transformations and Public Finances
Europe, 1650-1913
2011
How did today's rich states first establish modern fiscal systems? To answer this question, Political Transformations and Public Finances by Mark Dincecco examines the evolution of political regimes and public finances in Europe over the long term. The book argues that the emergence of efficient fiscal institutions was the result of two fundamental political transformations that resolved long-standing problems of fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. States gained tax force through fiscal centralization and restricted ruler power through parliamentary limits, which enabled them to gather large tax revenues and channel funds toward public services with positive economic benefits. Using a novel combination of descriptive, case study, and statistical methods, the book pursues this argument through a systematic investigation of a new panel database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. The book's findings are significant for our understanding of economic history, and have important consequences for current policy debates.
#55
Voter Turnout
A Social Theory of Political Participation
2011
This book develops and empirically tests a social theory of political participation. It overturns prior understandings of why some people (such as college-degree holders, churchgoers and citizens in national rather than local elections) vote more often than others. The book shows that the standard demographic variables are not proxies for variation in the individual costs and benefits of participation, but for systematic variation in the patterns of social ties between potential voters. Potential voters who move in larger social circles, particularly those including politicians and other mobilizing actors, have more access to the flurry of electoral activity prodding citizens to vote and increasing political discussion. Treating voting as a socially defined practice instead of as an individual choice over personal payoffs, a social theory of participation is derived from a mathematical model with behavioral foundations that is empirically calibrated and tested using multiple methods and data sources.
#56
Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections
Theory, Practice, and Implications
2013
Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions, and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation.
#57
Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments
2013
When are policy makers willing to make costly adjustments to their macroeconomic policies to mitigate balance-of-payments problems? Which types of adjustment strategies do they choose? Under what circumstances do they delay reform, and when are such delays likely to result in financial crises? To answer these questions, this book examines how macroeconomic policy adjustments affect individual voters in financially open economies and argues that the anticipation of these distributional effects influences policy makers' decisions about the timing and the type of reform. Empirically, the book combines analyses of cross-national survey data of voters' and firms' policy evaluations with comparative case studies of national policy responses to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/8 and the recent Global Financial Crisis in Eastern Europe. The book shows that variation in policy makers' willingness to implement reform can be traced back to differences in the vulnerability profiles of their countries' electorates.
#58
The Political Economy of the American Frontier
2013
This book offers an analytical explanation for the origins of and change in property institutions on the American frontier during the nineteenth century. Its scope is interdisciplinary, integrating insights from political science, economics, law, and history. This book shows how claim clubs – informal governments established by squatters in each of the major frontier sectors of agriculture, mining, logging, and ranching – substituted for the state as a source of private property institutions and how they changed the course of who received a legal title, and for what price, throughout the nineteenth century. Unlike existing analytical studies of the frontier that emphasize one or two sectors, this book considers all major sectors, as well as the relationship between informal and formal property institutions, while also proposing a novel theory of emergence and change in property institutions that provides a framework to interpret the complicated history of land laws in the United States.
#59
Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America
Stealing for the Team
2013
An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile.
#60
Trading Spaces
Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, 1970-2000
2013
This book is the first comprehensive study of foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization. Political economy FDI research has long focused on how host-country politics influence the supply of FDI, or how firms choose to invest. By contrast, this book focuses on the politics of FDI demand: the sources of citizens' preferences for FDI inflows and countries' foreign ownership restrictions. Professor Sonal S. Pandya's theory of FDI regulation identifies how FDI redistributes income within host countries, raises local wages, and creates competition for local firms. Policy makers regulate FDI inflows to facilitate local firms' access to these highly productive assets and the income they generate. Empirical tests also emphasize the central role of multinational cooperations' productive assets in shaping the politics of FDI. These tests feature an original dataset of annual country-industry foreign ownership regulations that spans more than one hundred countries during the period 1970-2000, the first dataset of FDI regulation of this detail and scope. This book highlights the economic and political foundations of global economic integration and supplies the tools to understand the growing economic conflicts between advanced economics and large emerging markets such as China and India.
#61
Social Choice and Legitimacy
The Possibilities of Impossibility
2014
Governing requires choices, and hence trade-offs between conflicting goals or criteria. This book asserts that legitimate governance requires explanations for such trade-offs and then demonstrates that such explanations can always be found, though not for every possible choice. In so doing, John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn use the tools of social choice theory to provide a new and discriminating theory of legitimacy. In contrast with both earlier critics and defenders of social choice theory, Patty and Penn argue that the classic impossibility theorems of Arrow, Gibbard, and Satterthwaite are inescapably relevant to, and indeed justify, democratic institutions. Specifically, these institutions exist to do more than simply make policy – through their procedures and proceedings, these institutions make sense of the trade-offs required when controversial policy decisions must be made.
#62
The Dilemma of the Commoners
Understanding the Use of Common-Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective
2015
One of the classic problems in social science is known as “the dilemma of the commons,” in which land, water, and other resources held jointly by social or economic segments tend to be depleted sooner and to a greater extent than privately held assets. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many aspects of western European society changed fundamentally, including the abolition of common-property rights, which in itself was related to social and economic shifts in that same society. This book intends to put the debate on commons, commoners, and the disappearance of both throughout early modern and modern northwestern Europe in a new light, through new approaches and innovative methodologies. Tine De Moor aims to link the historical debate about the long-term evolution of commons to the present-day debates on common-pool resources, as well as touching upon various disciplines within the social sciences that work on commons issues.
#63
Marketing Sovereign Promises
2016
How did England, once a minor regional power, become a global hegemon between 1689 and 1815? Why, over the same period, did she become the world's first industrial nation? Gary W. Cox addresses these questions in Marketing Sovereign Promises. The book examines two central the origins of the great taxing power of the modern state and how that power is made compatible with economic growth. Part I considers England's rise after the revolution of 1689, highlighting the establishment of annual budgets with shutdown reversions. This core reform effected a great increase in per capita tax extraction. Part II investigates the regional and global spread of British budgeting ideas. Cox argues that states grew only if they addressed a central credibility problem afflicting the Ancien Régime - that rulers were legally entitled to spend public revenue however they deemed fit.
#65
From Conflict to Coalition
Profit-Sharing Institutions and the Political Economy of Trade
2016
International trade often inspires intense conflict between workers and their employers. In this book, Adam Dean studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies. Dean argues that capital-labor agreement on trade policy depends on the presence of 'profit-sharing institutions'. He tests this theory through case studies from the United States, Britain, and Argentina in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; they offer a revisionist history placing class conflict at the center of the political economy of trade. Analysis of data from more than one hundred countries from 1986 to 2002 demonstrates that the field's conventional wisdom systematically exaggerates the benefits that workers receive from trade policy reforms. From Conflict to Coalition boldly explains why labor is neither an automatic beneficiary nor an automatic ally of capital when it comes to trade policy and distributional conflict.
#66
From Warfare to Wealth
The Military Origins of Urban Prosperity in Europe
2017
The economic rise of Europe over the past millennium represents a major human breakthrough. To explain this phenomenon, this book highlights a counterintuitive yet central feature of Europe's historical warfare. Historical warfare inflicted numerous costs on rural populations. Security was a traditional function of the city. To mitigate the high costs of conflict in the countryside, rural populations migrated to urban centers. Over time, the city's historical role as a safe harbor translated into local economic development through several channels, including urban political freedoms and human capital accumulation. To make this argument, the book performs a wide-ranging analysis of a novel quantitative database that spans more than one thousand years, from the fall of the Carolingian Empire to today. The book's study of urban Europe's historical path from warfare to wealth provides a new way to think about the process of long-run economic and political development.
#67
Spending to Win
Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies
2018
Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many. Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others? Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities. Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, Spending to Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography. Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations. Identical institutions have wide-ranging effects depending on the context in which they operate. No single institution is a panacea for issues, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or minority representation.
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Rule by Multiple Majorities
A New Theory of Popular Control
2018
What does it mean to say that citizens have control over their leaders? In a democracy, citizens should have some control over how they are governed. If they do not participate directly in making policy, they ought to maintain control over the public officials who design policy on their behalf. Rule by Multiple Majorities develops a novel theory of popular an account of what it is, why democracy's promise of popular control is compatible with what we know about actual democracies, and why it matters. While social choice theory suggests there is no such thing as a 'popular will' in societies with at least minimal diversity of opinion, Ingham argues that multiple, overlapping majorities can nonetheless have control, at the same time. After resolving this conceptual puzzle, the author explains why popular control is a realistic and compelling ideal for democracies, notwithstanding voters' low levels of information and other shortcomings.
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The Supreme Court
An Analytic History of Constitutional Decision Making
2019
This book presents a quantitative history of constitutional law in the United States and brings together humanistic and social-scientific approaches to studying law. Using theoretical models of adjudication, Tom S. Clark presents a statistical model of law and uses the model to document the historical development of constitutional law. Using sophisticated statistical methods and historical analysis of court decisions, the author documents how social and political forces shape the path of law. Spanning the history of constitutional law since Reconstruction, this book illustrates the way in which the law evolves with American life and argues that a social-scientific approach to the history of law illuminates connections across disparate areas of the law, connected by the social context in which the Constitution has been interpreted.
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Banks on the Brink
Global Capital, Securities Markets, and the Political Roots of Financial Crises
2020
This innovative analysis investigates a complex issue of tremendous economic and political what makes some countries vulnerable to banking crises, while others emerge unscathed? Banks on the Brink explains why some countries are more vulnerable to banking crises than others. Copelovitch and Singer highlight the effects of two variables in foreign capital inflows and the relative prominence of securities markets in the domestic financial system. Foreign capital is the fuel for banks' potentially dangerous behavior, and banks are more likely to take on excessive risks when operating in a financial system with large securities markets. The book analyzes over thirty years of data and provides historical case studies of two key countries, Canada and Germany, each of which explores how political decisions in the 19th and early-20th centuries continue to affect financial stability today. The analyses in this book have crucial policy implications, identifying potential regulations and policies that can work to protect banking systems against future crises.
Authors
Michael L. Ross
Author · 2 books
Michael Ross received his Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University in 1996. From 1996 to 2001 he was an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He also spent the 2000 calendar year as a Visiting Scholar at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., and Jakarta, Indonesia. He is now Professor of Political Science, and Director of the UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies. His research deals with political economy, democratization, natural resources, and poverty in the developing world - particularly (but not exclusively) in Southeast Asia. His main project is a book on the "resource curse" that explains why countries with lots of natural resource wealth tend to do worse than countries with with resource wealth. His 2008 article, "Oil, Islam, and Women," received the Heinz Eulau Award from the American Political Science Association, for the best article published in the American Political Science Review. Chair of UCLA International Development Studies Interdepartmental Program 2004-2008. Director, UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 2007-present.
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
Author · 3 books
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal is an economist and Professor of Business Economics at the California Institute of Technology.
David Stasavage
Author · 3 books
David Stasavage is the Julius Silver Professor in NYU’s Department of Politics and an Affiliated Professor in NYU’s School of Law, as well as its Department of History. He uses both current and historical data to investigate long run trends in inequality and in the development of state institutions. Recently, together with Ken Scheve at Stanford, he published Taxing The Rich, a book that charts the evolution of progressive taxation in twenty countries over the last two centuries. Before that he published States of Credit and Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State, two books in which he explored the joint development of representative government and public borrowing in Europe during the medieval and early modern periods. David has also published a number of articles on these and related topics. He is currently working on a book under contract for Princeton University Press that will explore the history of government by consent in a global setting, charting the long rise of democracy in Europe in comparison with China, the Middle East, and other world regions.
