Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State
France and Great Britain 1688-1789
1999
First Published
3.88
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224
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Part of Series
Does establishing representative democracy increase commitment to repaying public debt? This book develops a new theory about the link between debt and democracy and applies it to a classic historical eighteenth century Great Britain (which had strong representative institutions and sound public finance) vs. ancien regime France (which had neither). The study asserts that whether representative institutions improve commitment depends on the opportunities for government creditors to form coalitions with other groups. It is relevant to developing country governments with implications for government policy where credibility is a concern.
Avg Rating
3.88
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Author
David Stasavage
Author · 3 books
David Stasavage is the Julius Silver Professor in NYU’s Department of Politics and an Affiliated Professor in NYU’s School of Law, as well as its Department of History. He uses both current and historical data to investigate long run trends in inequality and in the development of state institutions. Recently, together with Ken Scheve at Stanford, he published Taxing The Rich, a book that charts the evolution of progressive taxation in twenty countries over the last two centuries. Before that he published States of Credit and Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State, two books in which he explored the joint development of representative government and public borrowing in Europe during the medieval and early modern periods. David has also published a number of articles on these and related topics. He is currently working on a book under contract for Princeton University Press that will explore the history of government by consent in a global setting, charting the long rise of democracy in Europe in comparison with China, the Middle East, and other world regions.
